On 2 June 2026, the U.S. Trade Representative proposed adding a 10%–12.5% surcharge on imports from 60 partners, including seven African countries, over alleged failures to ban or enforce bans on goods made with forced labor. …

On 2 June 2026, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer released proposed actions under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose additional duties of 10% to      12.5%      on imports from 60 economies found to be failing to combat forced labor, in a move backed by President Donald Trump. The USTR explains that these economies do not impose or effectively enforce a ban on imports produced with forced labor and therefore proposes a 10% or      12.5%      surcharge on their exports to the United States. This initiative puts seven African countries – Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa – in Washington’s firing line.

Analysis by data firm ONE Data shows that the higher U.S. tariff burden would fall most heavily on Egypt, Morocco and South Africa, whose export profiles to the United States are particularly exposed to the proposed duties. According to trade lawyers, these measures would sit on top of the global 10% levy adopted in February 2026 after the Supreme Court struck down an earlier framework, anchoring a durable tariff layer built on the forced labor rationale.

Which seven African countries are targeted?

The African Business article by David Thomas identifies seven African economies that could be subject to the Section 301 surcharge: Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. Under the structure outlined by USTR, countries that have adopted or partially implemented a forced-labor import ban would face an extra 10% duty, while those seen as having taken no meaningful steps would be hit with a      12.5%      rate.

For Egypt, which ships around $2.6 billion a year in goods to the United States, ONE Data estimates that its average effective tariff rate (ETR) would rise from  11.9%  to  13.8% , a 1.9-percentage-point jump driven by the dominance of textiles and apparel in its export basket. In Morocco, whose exports to the U.S. are put at roughly $1.8 billion, the ETR would climb from  9.9%  to  11.4% , again with a heavy impact on clothing and on agri-food items such as processed fish and fruit.

South Africa, with an export flow of about $14.6 billion, would see its ETR increase by 0.9 point to reach  10.4% , with most of the additional burden concentrated in precious metals, stones and jewellery, while vehicles are already subject to a separate 25% auto tariff and would not face further Section 301 duties. By contrast, the four other African countries on the list – Algeria, Angola, Libya and Nigeria – are major crude oil exporters; crude already faces near-zero tariffs and would not be covered by the proposed Section 301 surcharge, so the change in their ETRs is expected to be negligible.

A new layer on Trump’s tariff architecture

The USTR notes that this forced-labor push comes in a legal landscape reshaped by a Supreme Court ruling that found the administration’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for sweeping tariffs unlawful, prompting the White House to resort to Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act to impose a temporary global 10% duty. The African Business piece underlines that this safety net is due to expire on 24 July 2026 unless Congress acts, which increases the political pressure to build more targeted but longer-lasting schemes such as the new Section 301 measures.

International trade specialists stress that the Section 301 process – formal reports, written comment windows and public hearings – gives Washington a more WTO-compatible wrapper, while still offering a flexible tool to single out specific partners beyond the narrow issue of forced labor. Those same experts warn, however, that stacking tariff layers in this way complicates planning for foreign exporters, who must now navigate both the temporary global levy and the new Section 301 duties.

What is at stake for Africa: eroding preferences and supply-chain shifts

ONE Data’s modelling highlights that the sectors most exposed to the proposed surcharge are labour-intensive value chains – textiles and apparel, consumer goods and agri-processing – where African producers have relied on tariff preferences and lower wage costs to attract export‑oriented investment. By adding up to      12.5%      on top of the existing 10% baseline charge on exports to the U.S. market, the Section 301 initiative narrows those preferences and raises costs in already fiercely competitive segments.

For many emerging economies, including the seven African countries concerned, the combination of reputational risk linked to forced-labor scrutiny and a heavier tariff bill could accelerate supply-chain shifts toward jurisdictions seen as more compliant. At the same time, African Business notes that the immediate shock for Africa is concentrated in a limited set of sectors and countries, as the big crude exporters benefit from near-zero duties on oil and are largely insulated from the proposed surcharge.

Next steps: comment window through 6 July

The USTR’s timetable sets a deadline of 6 July 2026 for written submissions on the proposal, followed by public hearings, before a final decision on whether and how to implement the new tariffs. Advisory firms are urging importers and exporters in the affected countries to assess their exposure to the 10% and      12.5%      duties and, where relevant, to use the comment process to argue for product‑specific adjustments.

For African governments, the challenge is twofold: to position themselves in the legal and political debate now playing out in Washington, while at the same time tightening domestic frameworks against forced labor to reduce the risk that these surcharges become a permanent feature of their trade relationship with the United States.